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Articles

A musical retrieve of Heidegger, Nietzsche, and
technology: Cadence, concinnity, and playing brass
BABETTE E. BABICH
Department of Philosophy, Fordham University, 113 West 60th Street, New York,
NY 10023
In what follows, I discuss Heidegger's analysis of the essence of modern
technology as a version of what Heidegger names Nietzsche's highest will
to power together with Heidegger's understanding of Nietzsche's statement
of the nihilism of our day. I suggest that Heidegger's philosophic questioning of technology is necessarily foreclosed by his stylized, hermetic reading
of Nietzsche's expression of the will to power. Here I seek to read Heidegger's critique of technology in the light of rather than against Nietzsche's
critique of science and culture - that is, to speak Nietzsche's language: "Out
of the spirit of music." Thus, it will be necessary to read Heidegger's
reading of Nietzsche against Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche. But this is
to say that we must learn to read Heidegger. Reading Heidegger against
Heidegger, as Michael Theunissen observes, is not only a necessary
consequence and preservative against, as Jiirgen Habermas contends,
Heidegger's damning political convictions, but is in fact the condition sine
qua non of a genuine Auseinandersetzung with Heidegger. 1 In the present
essay, I seek to bracket Heidegger's stylistic retrieve of Nietzsche's
philosophy of nihilism in the service of the possibility of such an
Auseinandersetzung. In the resonance of Nietzsche's jesting reprobation of
philosophical conviction, such an Auseinandersetzung does not free us from
but rather exposes us to the task of learning how to read, how to think, and
- reading and thinking ourselves - how, in the end, to laugh.

Heidegger and Nietzsche reading the reader: Cadence, conviction, return
Heidegger is read as - Heidegger is accused o f - having read Nietzsche
against Nietzsche and having done so unfairly, misrepresenting his thought.
The charge is that levelled against Heidegger's philosophy in general:
Heidegger, it is said, embarks upon contradictory claims concerning
philosophers and philosophical traditions, which inaccuracy he fails to note;

240
he makes philological claims or traces etymological connections that cannot
stand up to closer, expert examination; he uses words and concepts inflatedly, so that his argument rises like a balloon to the heights of obscurity,
and so on. All this is particularly damning, it is thought, in the case of
Heidegger - a philosopher who matches Aristotle in condemning the entire
tradition before himself. For Aristotle, no earlier thinker had ever managed
to think the comprehensive, precise definition of a concept or a term, be that
term friendship or the nature of the good. For Heidegger, beginning as he
does from Brentano's expression of the manifold sense of Being in Aristotle, the tradition as a whole from the Greeks onward has failed to think the
essence of or the question concerning Being. In turn, for readers critical of
Heidegger, this failure to think Being is as nothing compared with the
meaninglessness of Heidegger's project.
I expect to be able to show why such anti-Heideggerian criticism misses
the point of Heidegger's reading of philosophy in general by considering
the rather more demanding case of Heidegger' s reading of Nietzsche. What
makes this case more demanding is not, contrary to Eric Blondel's assertion, the volume of Heidegger's work on Nietzsche. Rather what is
problematic here is Nietzsche himself.2 If any author has "made good" his
own predictions concerning his post-humous quality, his destined timeliness
for a coming era, it is Nietzsche. Where Shakespeare's sonnets are remarkable not for their subject extolling the singular virtues of his love but for his
recurrent egoism, proclaiming the eternal potency of the poet's word,
Nietzsche is hardly the first author to promise himself a destiny. What
makes Nietzsche so unusual is not the audacity of his proclamation but the
evidence for his claim, shown again and again in spite of and not on the
terms of his readers. If some could argue that Shakespeare's immortal
words have been blurred by the amber of authority, Nietzsche remains alltoo current. This is so despite the then-timeliness, that is, the historical
context which may plainly be read, for example, from the table of contents
of Beyond Good and Evil: "The Free Spirit," "The Religious Nature," "On
the Natural History of Morals," or "Peoples and Fatherlands." Taking off
from the very German and historical circumstances of his cultural
references and themes, Nietzsche nonetheless manages to speak as a
European and is rather more untimely, continually, renewedly untimely
than can be imagined for him to have been, as Riidiger Safranski rather
credulously suggests, only a child of his "wissenschaflsgliiubigen Zeitalters. ''3 If Nietzsche can do this, if Nietzsche can still speak to us, if he can
thus be part of our untimely destiny, as all the evident and continuing
currency of his name suggests, one would be remiss if one did not ask how
Heidegger gets off including Nietzsche within the scheme of Western
Metaphysics?
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What Heidegger does with Nietzsche is, of course, what he does with
other philosophers, where Heidegger's modus operandi routinely involves
such summary and denigrating points of departure. Accordingly, Being and
Time begins with double irony, that is with an ironic citation from Plato that
took Plato rather too much at his word: from then on, the battle of the giants
concerning Being is one which Plato and Aristotle incorporate but were
unable to decide. 4 Heidegger alone, it would seem, and Heidegger's
interpreters underline this point to the predictable vexation of readers with
other philosophic tastes, is the one who can restore the question of Being as
a question and follow it. Nietzsche will be read on the same misappointed
terms. Moreover, by condemning Nietzsche as the last metaphysician of the
West, particularly with reference to the question concerning technology,
reading Nietzsche as the advocate of dominion (Herrschaft) over the earth
embodied in the doctrine of will to power and the proclamation of the
(Ibermensch, Heidegger seems to sidestep the very confrontation he
proposes as essential for thought in general and he himself identifies as
characteristic of his lectures on Nietzsche in particular.
Yet Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche is an apposite rather than a failed
confrontation and we can see why if we consider Heidegger's own stylistic
strategy and, having adverted to it, identify its movement. Like Nietzsche
here, Heidegger explicitly addresses what is troublesome in the reading he
articulates (this is the cadence of his reading: where the claim is posed as it
falls, and falls out inappropriately to the ear of the reader). Like Nietzsche
too, Heidegger then pushes the dissonance of the pronouncement so that he
himself seems to anticipate - and more harshly if anything - the objections
a careful or discontented reader might make (this is the intensification or
conviction of his reading: where the claim is carried to an extreme, and not
only so that there is no mistake about it). Finally, and here he departs from
Nietzsche stylistically if not modally, Heidegger retrieves the fallen, nowcharged expression for the turning of his point (this is the recuperation or
return of his reading: where the first point is repeated in the direction of the
tonality to be heard, apart from but also through the ambiguity of language,
that is, thoughtful expression). To follow Heidegger, as to follow Nietzsche,
requires that the reader be prepared to think along with the thinker. Now
almost any philosophy will reward a careful reading, given attention to
what is or perhaps better could be meant along with the usual reading
adverting to the overlooked, the underemphasized, the misunderstood. But
Nietzsche and Heidegger for their part anticipate the critical reader's
response and that not merely as Aristotle had done, or the scholastic
tradition thereby influenced, that is, not merely formally. Rather than
thinking on the terms of the argument advanced of opposition formally
implicit in its expression or else contingent upon the meanings of its terms,
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and so on, Nietzsche and Heidegger are provocative, where this last
characteristic features most plainly in Nietzsche's style.
If the stylised didacticism of the above procedure of cadence, conviction,
and return may also be found throughout Heidegger's writings, it is especially characteristic of Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche. Thus where
Heidegger (notoriously) claims that Nietzsche is a thinker within (if also at
the end as the culmination of) Western metaphysics, he adverts to the
reader' s problems with this position from the start. In the first section of his
two volume study of Nietzsche then, rifled so that no one can miss the point
to be made: "Nietzsche as Metaphysical Thinker," Heidegger claims the
question "What is being?" as the metaphysical question par excellence and
maintains that "Nietzsche's thinking proceeds within the vast orbit of the
ancient guiding question of philosophy," that is, the question of
metaphysics.5 The anticipatory cadence is no harder to track here than the
force of Heidegger' s claim itself reflected in the section' s title. The cadence
begins with the very next sentence: "Is Nietzsche then not at all so modern
as the hubbub that has surrounded him makes it seem?''6 That this query is
not merely rhetorical is indicated by its intensification: "Is Nietzsche not
nearly so subversive as he himself was wont to pose?" Here the beginning
of the return follows as quickly in the next sentence: "Dispelling such fears
is not really necessary; we need not bother to do that." With this Heidegger
introduces the concession needed to understand the point of the radicality of
the first claim despite its apparent direction or anticipatory implication.
Thus if the falling out (which I am calling the cadence) of Heidegger's
claim that Nietzsche' s thought "proceeds within the vast orbit of the ancient
guiding question of philosophy, "What is being?" is the intensifying claim
that perhaps Nietzsche is less than modern, less subversive than had been
thought, the recuperation of Heidegger's position is clear in the concession
that has been more important for the very fact of subsequent Nietzsche
scholarship than almost any other expression of his thought, for with this
Nietzsche's thought is claimed neither for modern or modish nor for
subversive thought but rather for and as philosophy.7 What is recuperated
then is patent: "the reference to the fact that Nietzsche moves in the orbit of
the question of Western philosophy only serves to make clear that
Nietzsche knew what philosophy is. ''8
Heidegger will spend the rest of his Nietzsche reading repeating this
claim along with its implications. Thus if Heidegger claims as he does that
"If in Nietzsche' s thinking the prior tradition of Western thought is gathered
and completed in a decisive respect," we as readers not only of Heidegger
but also of Nietzsche may not dispense with the necessity of reading and
reflecting, of thinking back on what has been read as we read forward.
Thus we do not stop with the consequent continuation of the above implica-
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tion, that is, Heidegger's own project in reading Nietzsche, wherein "the
confrontation with Nietzsche becomes one with all Western thought
hitherto." We may not stop there because the meaning of "confrontation" as
Auseinandersetzung, that is, as interpretation or Auslegung, for Heidegger is
itself decisive for his thought and for the thinking of philosophy. Confrontation "is the supreme way, the only way, to a true estimation of a thinker."
The approximative expression is fortuitous, where for Heidegger, the
"confrontation with Nietzsche has not yet begun." In a preface written
in 1961, the confrontation is still a matter for preparatory thought, still
an issue as to whence "the "Nietzsche matter" comes and wither it goes"
which the reader may only decide in the same way, that is, by
thinking.9
Is the point to be made here that Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche is not
as abusive as it seems - which would seem to concede the direction of a
reading rather like what I have named, as the first tack of a Heideggerstyled cadence and in the already cadenced context then, an already decadent, already intensified point posed for a recuperation: but then all too
rhetorically posed to work (that is to have any rhetorical effect)? Yes and
no. For while Heidegger does not quite force the account on Nietzsche that
he has been taken to have done, he does both use and abuse the style of
claiming against ordinary convictions to bring the force of those convictions to light and thus advance the path of thought beyond such convictions.
The effect of the abuse of this tactic works against Heidegger, as against a
thinker who sought to think the complex side of truth in its ambiguity and
its mystery in what he called the clearing, the open. Thus Heidegger is
known for his obscurity. Nietzsche who sought to show his own darkness
by claiming allegiance with Heraclitus - the thinker of shadow and contradiction, daimonic character, cleansing fire, and the rule of logos - is
known as the most easily understood, the most fun, the paperback, readilyread, readily-quotable philosopher whose writings seem to work as well for
bathroom graffiti [God is Dead] as for introducing Conan, the Movie [What
does not kill me makes me stronger] as for prefacing chapters in new-age
self-help books [The two prior citations along with a selection of
apothegms on truth, destiny, and diet]. Such is fate. But I have sought to
suggest that Heidegger's problem is not that he misses Nietzsche's point.
Instead Heidegger's uses Nietzsche's insights against Nietzsche to advance
Heidegger's own project. It does not really speak against this strategy that
Heidegger was not able to completely read Nietzsche over to his own
project, that Heidegger borrowing not only Nietzsche's insights concerning
the reader for his authorial venture, his own strategic path of thinking, but
also Nietzsche's understanding of the nature of truth, should overreach
himself. It is an ancient Greek and mystical truism that condemned Heideg-
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ger's efforts here, a truth reflecting a spirit and a vengeance both Heidegger
and Nietzsche could have admired.

Heidegger and the truth of technology
The question concerning technology is a question concerning the truth of
technology, a questioning following upon, asking after technology in its
truth as destiny. But truth, conceived esoterically as aletheia, "is in a lofty
sense ambiguous. Such ambiguity points to the mystery of all revealing.''1°
For Heidegger, truth is unconcealment. In thinking truth "as the unconcealedness of beings, ''11 Heidegger turns to stress the concealed, prevailing
"in the midst of beings a twofold way." (WA 53) The ambiguous happening
of truth as unconcealment reveals what is, while at the same time concealing itself, which brings us to the familiar Heideggerian issue: "That which
is, the particular being, stands in Being." (WA 53) This is the realm in
which "every being stands for us and from which it withdraws." (WA 52)
The truth of technology is the address of truth, the inherently ambiguous
domain of the happening of truth. And mortal truth is ambiguous in just the
way that technology is ambiguous where both can be conceived as a
destining of revealing. The danger of technology, of Ge-Stell, here understood as Betrieb and as inherent in the essence and destiny of technique is
its denial of truth and human freedom conceived as resolute attention and
openness to the realm of destining. (QT 25) This is the danger that threatens
the truth of technology and the truth of revealing. Heidegger writes:
"Enframing, in a way characteristic of a destining, blocks poiesis." [Das
Ge-Stell verstellt das Scheinen und Walten der Wahrheit.] (QT 30) What is
blocked [verstellt] is the esoteric height or "lofty ambiguity" of truth. What
is left, what remains, is the way of calculating representation, that is, truth
reduced or leveled to the impoverished singularity of the "correct:"
"Enframing blocks the shining-forth and holding-sway of truth." (QT 28)
This is named the extreme danger of Enframing. Yet Heidegger also says
that this very blocking, the excluding of ambiguity that belongs to the very
essence of technological precision, because it is the danger inherent in a
destining of revealing, is also the saving possibility. 12
For Heidegger, the capital perspectival precision of phenomenology
concerns the essence of truth, of manifestation as what shows itself,
phainesthai, and obscures itself in shining forth as what is revealed. The
reader has heard all this before: unconcealment conceals concealment. This
is the essential ambiguity of technology as a way of revealing that points to
the mystery of essence as such. Thus for Heidegger, "the unconcealment in
which everything that is shows itself at any given time harbors the danger
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that man may quail at the unconcealed and thus misinterpret it." (QT 26)
What makes Enframing, as the essence of technology dangerous is, as we
have seen, two-fold. By speaking of revealing as two-fold Heidegger does
not articulate a humanism or subjectivism. What is unconcealed always
conceals, but this is not just a feature of human prejudice or phenomenological objectivity: rather this concealment, this veiling intrinsic to revelation,
belongs to the essence of what Heidegger calls truth. Revelation is the
shining forth of what is as it is, and it is this shining forth that conceals what
remains hidden and this has nothing to do with the point of view of the one
who beholds what is thus revealed if this one is also claimed to witness
what is at it is, and not for the sake of any accurate observation.
Human beings are ever (in essence) given over to belong to the coming
to pass of truth. In this way, the "saving power" H61derlin speaks of is
expressed by Heidegger as precisely that which "lets man see and enter into
the highest dignity of his essence... Keeping watch over the unconcealment
and with it, from the first, the concealment - of all coming to presence of
this earth." (32) For Heidegger, what is endangered is the aletheic, poetic
essence of truth, the veiled essence of truth, an insight he has from
Nietzsche, where he can say almost as Nietzsche would: "Truth is un-truth"
(WA 55) and mean, with reference to poiesis, to poetry, and the poet
already named, "Truth as the clearing and concealing of what is, happens in
being composed, as a poet composes a poem." (WA 72) For Heidegger, the
question concerning technology, the dangerous prospect of Enframing
reflects at every point the same conjunction between clearing and concealing. 13 As the poet composes a poem, the thinker here asks after the essence,
asks in the wake of, from out of solicitude for, technology. For Heidegger,
H61derlin's expression of the saving power grows from the danger:
"Whence something grows, there it takes root, from thence it thrives." (QT
28) This reflection brings us to the original expression of techne in its
mythical Greek beginning, as "a revealing that brought forth and hither and
therefore belonged within poiesis." (QT 34) In the present essay, "we are
summoned to hope in the growing light of the saving power" (QT 33)
where "the closer we come to the danger, the more brightly do the ways
into the saving power begin to shine and the more questioning we become."
(QT 35)
It is precisely because of the reflective piety of questioning that this
summons is not to be a mysticism or an apocalyptic eschatology. The
"fostering" of the saving power in which we are to hope, which we are to
preserve, is only sponsored "Here and now and in little things." (QT 33)
What is to be done is to be done "here and now," what must be safegarded,
preserved, secured can only be advanced "in little things." Thus, "the more
questioning we become," the more "pious" our thinking, the more we may
-
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forego the vulgar rule of the subject of humanism, domination, the control
of the earth. For Heidegger what we forego here returns us to the original
essence of techne, "as the bringing forth of the true into the splendor of
radiant appearing ... into the beautiful." (AT 34) The small wonder Heidegger enjoins "here and now and in little things" is the very wonder that a
thing can be. Yet we may note that because of the growing purview of
modern technology, because of the ordinary distance of what is closest to
us, to talk of wonder is almost too much, too precious for us.
Like the old philosophic prejudice against poetry, Heidegger finds the
modern, rationalistic prejudice at work in the same way in his reading of
Hrlderlin's promise: "...poetically man dwells..." Heidegger's charged
anticipation, cadence, and conviction, is offered, as usual, at the start of his
essay. The phrase "...poetically man dwells .... " for Heidegger, "comes to
us by a curious route." With this initial comment, Heidegger means to read
the poem that "beings 'In lovely blueness...'" but to "restore" the phrase
"thoughtfully to the poem," the cadence and concession to the reader
affirms "the doubts it immediately arouses. ''14 Such doubts speak in the
conviction that in a harried world of housing-concerns, "dwelling remain[s]
incompatible with the poetic." In the same day-to-day world, poetry is
hardly more than "a preoccupation with aestheticizing." Thus for Heidegger, "Poetry is either rejected as a frivolous mooning and vaporizing into
the unknown, and a flight into dreamland, or is counted as part of literature." (P 213) Apart from its literary function, which brackets poetry as
much as its aestheticization does, and construing poetry as imagination and
invention, as making, Heidegger recuperates the poet's phrase to the word.
Poetic diction has a precision that is not free fancy: "dwelling" is not
"housing." In the cadence conceding the convicted suspicions of the reader,
returning to the word, we may begin to see what Heidegger could mean by
speaking of the wonder of poetic saying as that which "brings the unsayable
as such into a world." (WA 74)
Only in renouncing human self-will can the human be freely "gathered"
into what is properly its own [ge-eignet], so that the human may, from
"within the safeguarded element of world.., as the mortal, look out toward
the divine.''15 "Otherwise not;" says Heidegger, For in any other wise we
would lack the question where "questioning is the piety of thought." (QT
35) Failing to question, we fail to pose the question of thought, we fail to
hold true to the task of thinking. Thus Heidegger reminds us that before we
may ask "What must we do" we are to ask "How must we think" (QT/T 40),
where thinking is "genuine activity." Belonging to Being, "primal corresponding, expressly carried out, is thinking." (QT/T 41) This then is the
turning. "The constellation of Being is the denial of the world, in the form
of injurious neglect of the thing." (QT/T 49) Yet to say this is to say that the
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world is denied and to say that, again, says nothing new to us. For the
postmodern era is nothing if it is not the era of heightened consciousness of
the jaded, of lost innocence. The world which the watchful, poetic word
preserves and here that is to say, saves, the world, the word is denied within
the reigning sphere of modern technology.
But an apocalyptic prediction of the denial of the world and language is
not all there is to say and that is why a somehow astonished Heidegger felt
it important to assure Richard Wisser during his "Television Interview" that
his thinking is not anti-technology. 16 For Heidegger, "Denial is not
nothing." (QT/T 49) Thus Heidegger's invocation and blessing - i.e., the
prayer - offered at the end of the essay on the "Turning" is a saying
following the question "What must we do?" This saying is offered precisely
where "it is the constellation of Being that is uttering itself to us," invoked
for those who "do not yet hear, we whose heating and seeing are perishing
through radio and film under the rule of technology." (QT/T 48) The
manifold question for thought, "Will insight into that which is bring itself
disclosingly to pass? Will we, as the ones caught sight of, be so brought
home into the essential glance of Being that we will no longer elude it?"
(QT/T 49) can now be unfolded into the blessing of Heidegger' s wish.
T. S. Eliot heard this connection, subscribed to us what must be done, as
task:
Then spoke the Thunder
DA
Datta: what have we given?
My friend, blood shaking my heart
The awful daring of a moment's surrender
Which an age of prudence can never retract
By this, and this only, we have existed. 17
What is to be thought here is the meaning of task as what is charged, as
Aufirag. This thought can be heard from the mystical heights of H61deflin's
admission at the end of the first version of Der Einzige, "Nie treff ich, wie
ich wiinsche / Das Maas. Ein Gott weiJ3 aber / Wenn kommet, was ich
wiinsche das Beste.-18 Again, at the conclusion of the later version of
Patmos, the poem so important to Heidegger,
...Nemlich rein
Zu seyn, ist Geschik, ein Leben, das ein Herz hat,
Vor solchem Angesicht', und dauert iiber die Hiilfie.
Zu meiden aber ist viel... 19
Another more recent poet cries, "Das alles war Auftrag." Rilke claims that
the season needs us, the very stars shine only for the consecration of the
heart, the song of the violin is offered for the one who in passing
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hears. 2° What the violin yields is given but what is assigned, what is
charged, is set to the one who can rise to match what is given, answering
what must be given, preserving the volatile and "awful daring," - the
essence of our being for Eliot and which is "not to be found in our
obituaries" - mastering as Rilke witnesses to the angel what is assigned us.
For H61derlin, this is to catch oneself gone upon the way one is to go, arced
and cast, like "Drachenz~ihne." All the while observing in song the law that
sends one upon that course of poetic preservation, of cultivation, where like
fallen wheat "nicht ein Clbel ists, wenn einiges/Verloren geht. ''21
"We look into the danger and see the growth of the saving power." (QT
33) This dangerous prospect is neither secure nor sure. For what we do
when we "look into the constellation of truth," when we attend upon
technology in its essence, or question concerning "the constellation in
which revealing and concealing, in which the coming to presence of truth
comes to pass," (QT 33) is thoughtful, recollective, meditative, poetic
watchfulness. And this is hard. What Heidegger in his essay on the "Origin
of the Work of Art" names echoing H61dedin from the start as "founding
preservation" [stiflende Bewahrung] and which in the essay on technology
is named in connection with being able to endure [wiihren] is finally
expressed as "what is granted [das Gewiihrte]. ''31 For Heidegger this is
what poetry can do: "Projective saying [Entwerfende Sagen] is saying
which in preparing the sayable, simultaneously brings the unsayable as such
into a world." (WA 74) The nature of art is in this way poetical. Thus
techne, in its origin "may awaken and found anew our look into that which
grants and our trust in it." (QT 35)
If Heidegger can question the saving power of poetry, of art, of techne as
it belongs to poiesis to ask as he does at the end in an intensification
without a concession, without explicit return, "Whether art may be granted
this highest possibility of its essence in the midst of the extreme danger, no
one can tell," (QT 35) it is because the danger here is the danger of failing
to wait, to pose and hold the question of the most questionable. Heidegger's
final word in "the Turning" is necessarily blessing and prayer: "May world
in its worlding be the nearest of all nearing that nears, as it brings the truth
of Being near to man's essence, and so gives man to belong to the disclosing bringing-to-pass that is a bringing into its own." (QT/T 49) In connection with poetry, Heidegger explains this that is "man's" own: "man is
capable of poetry at any time only to the degree to which his being is
appropriate to that which itself has a liking for man and therefore needs his
presence." (P 228)
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Nihilism and the question of value
It is on the terms of a deliberately post-humanistic pluralism of willing
being that Nietzsche raises what Heidegger calls the question of Being,
addressing the world, the organic, the thought of being and becoming,
interpretation, perspective, and event, speaking of history and politics,
people and customs, good and evil, men, women, sexuality, and power. 22
Here, if the postmodern condition of pluralism and fluid tolerance can be
said to be good for anything, it might be expected to open our philosophic
sensibilities to Nietzsche's recollection of the world of becoming and
innocence.
The object of philosophic inquiry for Nietzsche is the desire - the will of everything that is. Conceived as desire or will to power, the will does not
characterize the essence of being human as distinguished from the all.
Nature or the world, in Nietzsche's celebrated formula is "will to power and nothing else." Nietzsche rejects the fetishistic distinction between
humanity and all other ways of being. Reflecting on his own philosophy
and its projection, Nietzsche writes "I differentiate not a philosophy of the
individual but a hierarchy, a rankordering." This ranging differentiation as
will to power is the Anaxamandrian schema of coming into being, that is, of
becoming. Presubjective or postsubjective - such becoming must be
thought as the Greeks thought it and that does not revolve around
anthropomorphic differentiation and dissolution in time, that is, the
meaning of becoming is not a vanitas but must be thought as tragic mortality.
What may be named Nietzsche's elitism or hierarchic thinking (a
deliberate, willed ranking) is reflected in the schema of Will to Power and is
the essence of his philosophic project and his style. 23 A clear articulation of
the significance of Nietzsche's elitism is indispensable for an understanding
of Nietzsche's discussion of nihilism and values, especially the notion of
revaluing or coining values. But to understand elitism here is only to
emphasize the notion of difference in feeling and creation, the difference
between the will to power born to excess or lack, of abundance or inadequacy.
Heidegger reads Nietzsche's culture-critique as the thought of nihilism
conceived as "the inner logic of Western history, ''24 culminating in the
essence of m o d e m technicity. This consummate nihilism, Nietzsche's
creative nihilism of "strength" opposing the desultory nihilism of exhausted
ideals, sees the state of vanishing values and seizes for itself the right to
remake values, to revalue values, and with this to attain to happiness. Thus
Heidegger recalls Nietzsche's ecstatic proclamation of the promise of
creators become conscious of themselves - who "think and feel at the same
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time." In Nietzsche's words,
Whatever has value in our world now does not have value in itself,
according to its nature .... and it was we who gave and bestowed it. Only
we have created the world that concerns man . . . . we fail to recognize our
best power and underestimate ourselves... We are neither as p r o u d nor
as happy as we might be. 25
Attaining to this proud consciousness in a radical revaluation of values that
is Nietzsche's legacy as the creative expression of nihilism gives rise to the
supreme danger of the human destining-foreclosing essence of modem
technology: the illusion that "everything man encounters exists only insofar
as it is his construct." (QT 27) In the Beitriige zur Philosophie, Heidegger
calls this consequent illusion of material and cultural mastery, the
"Entzauberung des Seienden" - the loss of the enchanting force of everything that is. 26 We have already seen that by way of the modem era's
technologically mediated, self-consummated enchantment (Verzauberung)
of humanistic power, confirmed by sheer efficacy in doing, beings lose the
magic of being what they are, their thatness or emergent presence. For
Heidegger, far from the possibility of the smallest wonder, far from full
speech, far from bringing the "unsayable as such into a world" articulated in
poetic reticence, or from Heidegger's own preparatory thinking,
Nietzsche's cultural analytic of nihilism poses the possibility of the revaluation of values as a Machenschafi of values consciously seized and expressed by the will to power. The darkening force of the age of modem
technology follows from its essence in the closure of metaphysics as an
expression of what Heidegger takes in Nietzsche's name to be the highest
will to power.
Because there are different schemas of inventive human possibility, will
to power for Nietzsche may be distinguished according to its original
genesis in each case. So far from being at its height as domination, which is
not to say self-cultivation, Nietzsche's esoteric conception of the highest
will to power articulates a consummately expressed letting-be not unlike
Heidegger's thought of Gelassenheit. And, I will suggest, if we are to think
Heidegger's expression of the shadowed possibility of redemption or
healing interior to the growing danger that is the essential darkness of
modem technology as a possibility, we cannot fail to reflect upon, to really
ponder and so to catch the evaluative, creative difference, the hierarchy of
feeling separating rancor and delight, glum preservation and blessing.
Countering the tenor of Heidegger's reading, Nietzsche's highest will to
power is no opposition to becoming, it does not conceive Being as fixed,
and by dint of its nature, the highest, creative Will to Power of overweening, overwhelming abundance is foreign to the technological transformation
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of the face of the world in the image of so much raw material for human
construction and ready reserve. The redemption Nietzsche's Zarathustra
traces in the dark morning sky is the redemption of becoming conceived in
the lightning-flash, in contrast with being, with fixity, that is to say: chance.
Instead of a designed cosmos or heaven of Reason, Zarathustra descries the
heavenly roll of the dice: "Over all things stands the heaven Accident, the
heaven Innocence, the heaven Chance, the heaven Prankishness." (Z:III,
"Before Sunrise") Such a chance cosmos is nothing but chaos, under the
sign of forgiveness, the artifice of the cosmos absolved as artifice, the
lightning flash that illuminates becoming redeemed in opposition to the
fixity of being.
When we read Nietzsche's analysis of nihilism, we cannot forget that
what he does is to ask "what kind of human being" could count as lord of
the earth, only to give an answer in terms of the lowest will to power: the
will that grows in rancor. Thus Nietzsche's Zarathustra contrasts the
"lowest" with the "highest species of all being." The highest, "the most
comprehensive soul, which can run and stray and roam farthest within
itself, the most necessary soul," is the soul of redeemed or innocent becoming, crowned by the blessing of chance. Such a soul "out of sheer joy
plunges itself into chance - having being, [it] dives into becoming." (Z:III
O 19) In opposition to this is the lowest species or type of being, the
parasite, which Zarathustra also names "the lazy creepers, and all the
ravenous vermin." These latter correspond of course to Nietzsche's
celebrated, all-too-convenient rabble, whose ways are, we are told over and
over again, "dark ways, verily, on which not a single hope flashes anymore.
Let the shopkeeper rule where all that still glitters is - shopkeeper's gold...
Look how these people are now like shopkeepers: they pick up the smallest
advantage from any rubbish." (Z:III O 21)
Beyond the level of the banal or the everyday, there is still a temptation
to what Nietzsche calls rancune, the result of absorption and a lack of
artistic, creative distance. But if it is hard to read Heidegger reading
Nietzsche as he reads Nietzsche for his own purposes, it is harder to read
Nietzsche without knowing ourselves and our thinking, without being sure
of our purposes. How are we to read Nietzsche, who writes against himself,
as against his reader, the Nietzsche who writes for a rare understanding?
How are we to read as the bearers of, the seekers of such a rare or elite
understanding? How close must one be to oneself to understand Nietzsche' s
claim already cited from the Gay Science that "we are neither as proud nor
as happy as we might be?"
The mischief here is that the closer we are to ourselves, the more
ponderously we are likely to take Nietzsche's claims, his warnings, his
seductions, and the more likely we are to read the standard relativist schema
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into Nietzsche's suggestion that "only we have created the world that
concerns man." The issue of rank order, the position of soul - self-disposition - the nature and kind of Bestimmung required by the self-cultivated
artist, the artist of the grand style, calls for an artist's aesthetic. This
aesthetic, this style, for all its seriousness still needs the balancing, heightening cry of mirth and pleasure that knows itself and its limits and knows both
enough to say and to mean: wholan! Do we ever know ourselves truly
enough in what we do - we men, or is rather for this author: we women of
knowledge? If we were able to trace this esoteric connection further, would
we find that the highest mirth and pleasure yokes fool and poet, finds song
in the swan's choking death, and hears the first of music in that which sings
of no sadness but the "sadness of the most profound happiness," (GS 183)
or the joy which, Hrlderlin's Sophoclean insight tells us, is the ultimate
expression of tragedy? For whom?
Quoting his own "gaya scienza" in his description of the typology of
Zarathustra in Ecce Homo, Nietzsche describes the new philosophers, the
"men of knowledge," those of rare understanding conceived as he sought
them with his tragic project of philosophic overtures as the "nameless, selfevident ... premature births of an as yet unproven future." For their very
possibility in coming to be, for our own corresponding possibility to emerge
as readers of Nietzsche's rare understanding, what is needed is what
Nietzsche calls "great health." Such health is not possessed but inherited
(or invented): it must be won and rewon and perpetually re-won because
one "gives it up again and again, and must give it up." The highest will to
power is distanced from rancor as its transformation on the basis of the
sunlike benediction of Zarathustra's cultivated abundant power, a power
that is not only beyond good and evil. Thus Zarathustra would have the love
of the neighbor transformed into the love of the friend: "I teach you the
friend in whom the world stands complete." In this artistic, aesthetic vision,
Nietzsche conceives the image of the "creative friend who always has a
complete world to give away." Such a vision as Nietzsche offers here
reflects the height and the consequences of gift and benediction. From this
tragic height alone may we see the advantage, see from the advantage of
becoming in the turning of heroic blessing: "And as the world rolled apart
from him, it rolls together again in circles for him, as the becoming of the
good through evil, as the becoming of purpose out of chance. ''27

Nietzsche's metaphysical nihilism: Adventavit asinus
For Heidegger, Nietzsche's thought concerning nihilism underscores the
emergent rule of the eminently technologizable, practical, material world by
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pronouncing the wodd of the metaphysical or the suprasensory, the wodd
of the highest values dead or at an end, as nothing, that is, "without effective power. ''28 In an Hegelian turn, Heidegger finds Nietzsche's antiPlatonic opposition to metaphysics remaining, necessarily "as does everything "anti," held fast in the essence of that over against which it moves."
(WN 61) To see the truth of this claim beyond the movement of an
Hegelian - and so Nietzsche-antipathic - opposition, it is necessary to
consider Nietzsche's own insight into this same entanglement.29 If
Nietzsche is not trapped by his own words, Heidegger's point has no
purchase. Yet if Nietzsche is trapped, we nevertheless find that like the
logical traps of his contradictory design concerning truth and the laws of
physics, Nietzsche knows the dialectical conversion so well in advance that
it is articulated in the turns of this very anticipation. Played with
Nietzsche's fingers, logic now works uncannily against itself, as selfconstructed and so ultimately, effective self-deconstructive, that is a logic of
expression styled to match and name nihilism. 3° This conversion is effected
by a reader-selective troping of the text that I name Nietzsche's concinnity31 The reference to the musicality of Nietzsche's philosophical style seeks
to account for Nietzsche' s deliberately styled question of the meaning of the
past, of time and will, that is, again, of the relationship between being and
becoming. Beyond Derrida and Foucault, beyond Ricoeur and Gadamer, to
understand the project of Nietzsche's style, Nietzsche's musical challenges
or turns, Heidegger is a thinker who for all his deliberate appropriation
remains a reader able to read Nietzsche as one who knows what philosophy
is, that is a fellow thinker, who shares the question of Being and of time, by
exceeding it.
While Nietzsche recognized the force of mass culture as an expression of
the will to technological power, this mass culture, the culture of nihilism, of
dominion over the earth is not the expression of the overman. As noted in
the preceding consideration of the elite or active character of the Will to
Power, dominion as such cannot be the proper expression of the overman.
The desire for dominion springs from the reactive desire born of a need for
power. Thus lacking, mass or contemporary Western culture gives rise to
the Zarathustran apothegm: "Man is something that must be overcome."
The will to power that yields the culture of nihilism must be understood as
more than the expression of a will to the revaluation of all values. The will
of average, reactive, or mass culture is a consequence of deficiency. This is
the will of the reactive, the weakened, the overshocked, the impotent. This
will to power works in the sphere of existent values, it is the triumph of the
ascetic ideal once again, and at all costs as Nietzsche describes this
metamorphosis in The Genealogy of Morals.
But if Nietzsche classes the values of this ascetic will as slave values, it
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must never be forgotten that he also tells us that these are the very triumphant values of our time. Although it works in the service of life, the ascetic
will refuses life. That is its paradox and for Nietzsche that is its ultimate,
extreme danger: the danger of decadence. The life-denying will of the slave,
of reactive humanity is not controlled by and can never be controlled by any
active or master will. By virtue of its orientation and the tenacity of its drive
for power, the reactive will is the most powerful will to power: "the weaker
dominate the strong again and again - the reason being that they are the
great majority, and they are also cleverer...'32 For Nietzsche, in a decadent
age,
nothing can last beyond the day after tomorrow, one species of man
excepted, the incurably mediocre. The mediocre alone have the prospect
of continuing on and propagating themselves - they are the men of the
future, the sole survivors (BGE 262/182).
This reactive, measure, mediated species stands in opposition to the
(vanished and largely impossible) noble type: the sovereign individual. It is
only the sovereign individual who can command. Such a one, Heidegger
reminds us, first gives the law to one's self (as Nietzsche says in the
Genealogy o f Morals, proposing this law and posing oneself before it, at
one's own cost, with no other bond than one's body). With such freedom,
such power to command is active revaluation or creation of values. The
sovereign, artist's revaluation grows from the active affirmation of itself,
the affirmation of a creative will.
The slave revaluation of values, on the other hand, is born of reaction: an
"inversion of the value-posing eye," (GM 36) which brings any active
power into its compass and so converts all pretensions to difference in the
reactive spirit of its self-assertion. Its entrepreneurial creativity is based on
denial of what is (this is realized by its technical, mechanical-manipulative
dominion over nature and itself).
For Heidegger, Nietzsche' s philosophy of Will to Power and the thought
of the Eternal Return is a valorization o f the latter reactive scheme of world
domination, as the will to secure, "to seal Becoming with the character of
Being." (WP 330) Commenting on Rilke's poetic word of untoward
redemption, the protection (bergen) of our unshieldedess (Schutzlossein),
Heidegger recalls that "Secure, securus, sine cura means: without care. The
caring here has the character of purposeful self-assertion by the ways and
means of unconditional production. We are without such care only when we
do not establish our nature exclusively within the precinct of production and
procurement, of things that cannot be utilized and defended." (WP 120) 33 It
is from out of the spirit of this secure responsiveness that "Nietzsche
pondered the essence of that humanity which, in the destining of Being as
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the will to power, is being determined toward the assuming of dominion
over the earth." (WN 98)
Heidegger's assertion here is fair enough in venture and vantage. The
venture of high responsibility of the will to power that could support such
an assumed dominion over the earth is the care of generosity in the extreme,
while this in its turn requires the vantage of power in excess. But this dyad
is a tricky one. Heidegger's point turns on a philosophical precision in
Nietzsche's thought on the will to power and it is troublesome because of
the easy equivocation which can collapse or fail to reflect the only indispensable force of Nietzsche's insight into the opposed registers of expression/acquisition articulating the universality of will to power.'
As we have already seen, the technological project of "dominion over
that which is as such" (WN 99) cannot for Nietzsche be the active but only
the reactive project of the revaluation of values. Although Heidegger
understands the distinction between action and reaction as the distinction
between overflowing power as the expression of a will, he does not think
the predominance of desperate neediness as the technic of a will. The
essence of this distinction of the rule of a lack or a weakness corresponds to
its rank-ordering: if the historical destiny of inadequacy is its desire for
compensation and its triumph over all other values, it is not for that the
highest value. In the order of rank, the highest value is literally above
ordinary possibility; the hierarchy ascends from the esoteric to the exoteric.
Reading Heidegger's conception of nihilistic value and justice in the
light of Nietzsche's constitutional polarization of will to power, nihilism is
ambiguous because it corresponds to a devaluing of the highest values and
at the same time to a "countermovement to devaluing." (WN 68) The will
to power corresponds both to the expression of power and to the desire for
power. The former, conceived as affirmation is only possible on the basis of
abundance, the source of expression, while the latter desire for power grows
out of the constraints of denial. In this last and most frequent circumstance
of the will to power, power must be understood as a lack, and will to power
thus understood is the occasion of preservative, accumulative desire. This
same ambivalence is again double valued in accordance with the origin of
revaluation. There is not only a revaluation of values that emerges on the
basis of weakness (self-preservation) but there is also a revaluation born of
strength (self-expression).
For Nietzsche, the fundamental tendency of organic being is a drive to
expression: "A living thing desires above all to vent its strength - life as
such is will to power -: self-prese~ation is only one of the indirect and
most frequent consequences of it." (BGE 14/26) The life of superabundance
seeks to express or expend its substance. Self-preservation may indeed
result from such expression butit is inherently related to expression as such
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and indeed opposed to it. Expression expends power while preservation
saves or conserves power. To say that self-preservation can be (even a
frequent) result of such expression does not ameliorate its inherent incompatibility with the expression of power as such. One may not vent one's
power while at the same time keeping it in reserve (conserving or preserving it). It is this essential opposition that makes the valorization of a life of
abundant or creative self-expression fancifully romantic and ordinarily and
for the most part tactically vain. Nietzsche's characterization of an era of
revaluation fails to accord with the neediness of our times.
Opposing the aesthetic height of creative will to power, the contrary and
preservational impulse of reactive will to power moves into an encircling
sphere of world involvement and calculation which must always exclude
Heidegger's expression of Nietzsche's redemptive triad - blunting the
possibility of the hero's tragedy, unable to comprehend the satyr-play
between earth and sky of the demi-god, denying the world-ringing God. In
place of Nietzsche's hierarchic triad of aesthetic possibility, the reactive
mode of inventive, technological will to power seeks the satisfaction of
green pasture simplicity in its technological expression as dominion over
the world of nature. Given Nietzsche's well-known emphasis upon the alltoo-in the excessively, ever-still-merely-human, it is not possible to say of
all humans, as Heidegger seeks to categorize being human on the basis of
the consciousness that "God is dead," that humanity is thereby in Hegelian
fashion enabled to pass "over into another history that is higher, because in
it the principle of value-positing, the will to power, is experienced and
accepted expressly as the reality of the real, as the Being of everything that
is." (WN 95) Such a realization may be possible for creative beings, for
artists and as the self-realization of artists. But let us not forget that for
Nietzsche most of us, as knowers, whether we can claim to be artists or not,
"are unknown to ourselves. ''34
To know ourselves, to remember ourselves, to cry out of ourselves and to
laugh at ourselves is to begin to dance with light feet. It is this that is to
regain the delight one had as a child at play. But we cannot embrace the
romantic dilletante's or the more recent version of this romanticism in the
new-age ethos of just-so self-invention, nor follow Alexander Nehamas's
well intentioned reading of Nietzsche: Life as Literature. To give style to
°one's character as Nietzsche prescribes, is not only not prescribed for
everybody but is so reserved for a reason. That reason is pain, it is in this
way that thinking, that poetry is, here once again, hard. The laughter of the
Nietzschean artist may not be thought as a laughter without pain, without
terrible sacrifice, without cruelty to oneself and to others. Thus as Nietzsche
says this ideal of "superhuman wellbeing and benevolence ... will often
appear inhuman." (EH:Z, 2) Neither can the dance be thought without the
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stumbling fall, the crippling repetition, the exhaustion of body and soul for
one end, neither can word be thought without the stammer, the never
exhausted failure of foolishness, and the empty echo. Even the music
Nietzsche celebrates is not immune where he can write of his anguish
concerning the fate of music that it can be and "has been done out of its
world-transfiguring, Yes-saying character, so that it is music of decadence
and no longer the flute of Dionysus," (EH:CW, 1; 317) and where even
music turns into decay, the hurdy gurdy song, silence is almost the only
pure tone and we find that even that is awkward. Again: only we have
created the world that concerns man. We have seen this ambiguity before in
speaking of the essence of poetry, the spirit of music as the saving power.
Here again the same ambiguous laughter of chance and delight - at what is
in its glory and its bitter misery, where glory itself is nothing save such
misery transformed by the "grand style," by heroic pride, by magnanimity
and affirmation in expressing, at disposing of the powers in oneself, by joy
- is also the only key to the "proud happiness" Nietzsche at the end of his
life would call the fierce halcyon joy of the creator: "the halcyon, the light
feet, the omnipresence of malice and exuberance." This Zarathustra is
"eloquence become music." (EH: Z, 6, p. 305) 35
For Nietzsche, "playing and brass," eloquence and vulgarity, delight and
horror may not be separated. More than that, "malice and exuberance,"
cruelty and creation go together and this is no accident of human earthbound creativity. Thus, Zarathustra echoes the spirit of Nietzsche's first
reflections on The Birth of Tragedy: "as deeply as man sees into life, he also
sees into suffering." (Z:III, ON 2) In a resonant, reader-evocative, reader
echoing concinnous turn, Nietzsche reminds us that even in such words
"there is much playing and brass. He that has ears to hear, let him hear."
What must be underlined here is the self-conscious teasing challenge, the
awareness of limit and prescription, of the absurd dominance of one's
convictions. For Nietzsche, "to put it in the words of an ancient Mystery:
adventavit asinus, pulcher et fortissimus." (BGE 8) Later in order to
introduce his notorious and lengthy fugue against "women as such" in the
same text, Nietzsche identifies such "convictions" as "signposts" to the
"great stupidity which we are ... the unteachable 'right down deep' ." (BGE
231) This perspective on one's convictions articulates the supreme nuance
between the illusion of truth and the truth of illusion. Only the latter is art
and only this can be music. Only the artist who deals in his illusions without
illusion, with irony and mirth, be this artist of life philosopher or dancer,
musician or poet-fool, can be the artist, the new technician of Nietzsche's
re-valuation of values. As Nietzsche's diamond device reminds us here, "if
your hardness does not wish to flash and cut and cut through, how can you
one day create with me?" (Z:III ON 29) For, when one philosophizes with a
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hammer, after Nietzsche, post-Nietzsche as we are, are we not at last, at
least able to relinquish the current conviction, the cultural current of
conviction in our still-present fear of dissolution, that such a nihilism, such
a dominion, such a declared promise and intention towards a lordship over
the earth ("I am prepared to rule the world.t) is spoken, if only in part than
still at least this far: in jest. What more do we need, past, post-Nietzsche?
Not that Nietzsche does not "mean" to be taken seriously, that is not the
point here, but much rather that after an exchange, a dialectic, an incorporative rumination upon and with this philosopher of grand phrasings (and this
fine, resonant schema surely describes Nietzsche's good readers, such as we
are, all of us) we should be able to think back on the achievement of style to
wonder, to ask how it is, after all, that words, that human beings can
overcome themselves? If Nietzsche sings of the dancing star born to beings
that play with stars and who have always played with stars, whether they
knew it or not, what he celebrates is the depth of the world, the lens of life.
This is the dancing shimmering light, the irridescent happiness, the song of
sadness welling on the surface, tears shining in the darkness, the sun's gold
on the fisherman's oar, light feet over an abyss.

Notes

1. Michael Theunissen, "Was heute ist. Ober Not und Notwendigkeit des
Umganges mit Heidegger," in Martin Heidegger: Fragen an sein Werk. Ein
Symposion (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1977), p. 21.
2. Eric Blondel, Nietzsche le corps et la culture (Paris 1986).
3. For Blondel's suggestion see the first three chapters of his Nietzsche le corps et
la culture, trans. Se~n Hand, Nietzsche: The Body and Culture, Philosophy as
Philological Genealogy (London: Athlone Press, 1991; Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1991). For Safranski, see Riidiger Safranski, Wieviel
Wahrheit braucht der Mensch? Uber das Denkbare und das Lebbare.
(M~inchen/Wien: Carl Hanser, 1990), p. 71.
4. "For manifestly you have long been aware of what you mean when you use the
expression "being." We, however," concludes Heidegger's introductory quote
taken from Plato's Sophist, "who used to think we understood it, have now
become perplexed." Thus Heidegger's first paragraph for the first to the last
sentence in his introduction to Being and Time, expositing the "Question of the
Meaning of Being" accuses the whole philosophical tradition of forgetfulness
and trivializing. Being and Time, trans. Macquarrie and Robinson. (New York:
Harper & Row, 1962), quote p. 19/1 SZ
5. Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche. Volume One: The Will to Power as Art, trans. D.
F. Krell (New York: Harper & Row, 1979), p. 4. [Heidegger, Nietzsche: I
(Pfullingen: Neske, 1961), p. 12.] Hereafter, references to the German edition
will be made with a separating virgule following page references to the English
language translation.
6. Ibid.

259
7.
8.
9.
10.

11.

12.

13.

14.
15.
16.

17.
18.

19.

20.

21.
22.

Cf. David Allison's "Preface" to The New Nietzsche.
Heidegger, Nietzsche: 1, p. 4/p. 12.
Heidegger, Nietzsche: 1, p. xvi/p. 10.
Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology," in The Question Concerning Technology, trans. W. Lovitt (New York: Harper & Row, 1979), p. 33.
Henceforward abbreviated QT.
Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," in Albert Hofstadter, Poetry,
Language, Thought, p. 52. Henceforward abbreviated as WA, with page
numbers inserted into the text.
"Enframing...threatens to sweep man away into ordering as the supposed
single way of revealing, and so thrusts man in the danger of the surrender of
his free essence [but] it is precisely in this extreme danger that the innermost
indestructible belongingness of human being within the granting may come to
light, provided that we for our part, begin to pay heed to the coming to
presence of technology." (QT 32).
"On the one hand, Enframing challenges forth into the frenziedness of ordering
that blocks every view into the coming-to-pass of revealing and so radically
endangers the relation to the essence of truth. On the other hand, Enframing
comes to pass for its part in the granting that lets man endure...that he may be
the one who is needed and used for the safekeeping of the coming to presence
of truth." (QT 33)
Heidegger, "...Poetically Man Dwells..." in Poetry, Language, Thought, p.
213. Henceforward abbreviated as P.
Heidegger, "The Turning" in The Question Concerning Technology, p. 47.
Henceforward abbreviated QT/T.
Heidegger, "...das ich nicht gegen die Technik bin..." p. 25 in "Das Fernseh
Interview" in Antwort." Martin Heidegger im Gesprgich, hrsg. G. Neske, E.
Kettering (Pfullingen: Neske, 1988).
T. S. Eliot, The Wasteland: V.
Hrlderlin, "Der Einzige" Erster Fassung, trans. Richard Sieburth, "I never
achieve the measure I wish. But a god knows when the best I wish comes
true."
Hrlderlin, Patmos, Bruchstticke der sp~iteren Fassung, trans. Michael Hamburger, "For to be pure is a skill, a life that has a heart, in the presence of such
a face, and outlasts the middle. Buch much is to be avoided."
Ja, die Friihlinge brauchten dich wohL Es muteten manche
Sterne dir zu, daft du sie spiirtest. Es hob
sich eine Woge heran im Vergangenen, oder
da du voriiberkamst am gerffneten Fenster,
gab eine Geige sich hin. Das alles war Auftrag.
Rainer Maria Rilke, Duino Elegies: I.
Hrlderlin, Patmos, trans. M. Hamburger, "And there's no harm if some of it is
lost."
Because such a deliberate philosophy of opposition as Nietzsche's elicits
denigration in the established tradition of philosophy from Aristotle to
Wittgenstein, Davidson and even Derrida, Nietzsche's voice is heard in the
tones of fancy or poetry. On the other side, Nietzsche lacks a philosophical
voice because of the resonant impoverishment of tradition. Hence Nietzsche
finds himself closest to the Presocratic thinker known for his own esoteric
darkness: Heraclitus, while, let it be noted, the issue of value must be decided

260
between the two names Anaximander and Empedocles.
23. It is relevant that this elitism has found little correspondence, hardly any
recognition or confirming, echoing resonance within the leagues even of
Nietzsche's most fervent interpreters.
24. Martin Heidegger, "The Word of Nietzsche: God is Dead," in William Lovitt,
trans. The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays (New York:
Harper & Row, 1977), p. 67. Henceforward abbreviated as WN, with page
numbers inserted into the text.
25. Nietzsche, The Gay Science, 301. trans. W. Kaufmann (Random House: New
York, 1974), p. 242. Henceforward abbreviated as GS, with page numbers
inserted into the text.
26. Heidegger, Beitr~ige zur Philosophie. Vom Ereignis (Frankfurt a/M.: Klostermann, 1989), p. 107.
27. Z:I, "On Love of One's Neighbor." Modified translation.
28. Heidegger, "The Word of Nietzsche: God is Dead," p. 61. Henceforward
abbreviated WN.
29. The value of Heidegger's claim of entanglement is not disputed here: it is
patently and in Heidegger's own sense: correct.
30. "Those who fancy themselves free of nihilism perhaps push forward its
development most fundamentally." p. 63. This "uncanny guest" heralding the
end of modernity's ambitious adventure in history.
31. See my "On Nietzsche's Concinnity: An Analysis of Style." Nietzsche-Studien
19 (1990):59-80).
32. Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Harmondsworth and
New York: Penguin, 1981), p. 76.
33. For Heidegger, "future thinking" must be tempered by the character of what he
names, counting on the resonance of his earlier notion of anticipatory resolve,
or authenticity a "high responsibility." This "high responsibility" may be
understood as a charge linking the early Heidegger's expression of "care"
(Sorge) in Being and Time with his later more ambivalent expression of saving
or protection, security. Heidegger cites Rilke's unfinished poem WP 99. The
relevant German text runs as follows
...was uns schliefllich birgt,
ist unser Schutzlossein und daft wirs so so
ins Offne wandten, da wirs drohen sahen,
um es, im weitesten Umkreis irgendwo,
wo das Gesetz uns anriihrt, zu bejahen.
- Rilke, "improvisierte Verse, cited in Heidegger, "Wozu Dichter," Holzwege,
(Frankfurt a.M.: Klosterman, 1950), p. 273.
34. Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, Preface. Even philosophers of the
future, corresponding to Nietzsche's temporary schema, cannot always be
conscious of what is created by their own artistic temperament or that their
own cultivatedly aesthetic values are the fruit of both body and mortal soul.
The thing about this kind of self-knowledge is that it excludes itself in its
achievement.
35. Ecce Homo, "Thus Spoke Zarathustra": 6, p. 305 "In every word he contradicts, this most Yes-Saying of all spirits; in him all opposites are blended
into a new unity. The highest and the lowest energies of human nature, what is
sweetest and most frivolous, and most terrible wells forth from one fount with
immortal assurance."

